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Abstract. Remote voting systems implementing the homomorphic tal-
lying paradigm have proven to be the best option for elections with a
small range of candidates. In this paper, we propose a new homomor-
phic tallying remote voting system that makes use of elliptic curve cryp-
tography. The proposed system is suitable for multiple choice elections.
Detailed security and performance analysis are provided.
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1 Introduction
Remote voting systems allow the participants to cast their ballots from any
place with an available Internet connection. At the end of the voting period, the
votes can be tallied automatically, reducing the economic cost while improving
the speed and accuracy of the process. Unfortunately, the fact that the voting
platform is accessible through the Internet makes it vulnerable to attacks coming
from the network. Hence, security is a key aspect to consider. A remote voting
system must provide the following security properties:
Authentication: only the votes cast by eligible voters are taken into account.
Unicity : a participant can vote once at most.
Privacy : vote content cannot be related to the identity of its caster.
Fairness: partial results are not revealed.
Verifiability : correctness of the voting process can be checked. A voting system
is universally verifiable if any external entity can verify that all votes have
been properly counted. If voters can only verify that their own vote has been
taken into account, the scheme is individually verifiable.
Uncoercibility : a voter cannot prove she voted in a particular way.
The aforementioned security requirements are achieved by making use of
advanced cryptographic techniques. According to the way in which cryptography
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is used, remote voting schemes can be classified into three main paradigms: mix-
type, blind signature-based and homomorphic tallying.
The mix-type paradigm [16,18,21] resembles paper-based traditional voting
using a ballot box. Eligible voters generate their votes, encrypt them using the
election public key and sign their encrypted vote (ballot) before sending it to the
polling station. In order to authenticate each voter, the polling station verifies
the signature of the received ballots. Once the voting period is concluded, the
ballots are mixed (shuﬄed and remasked) in order to break the link between
them and the identity of voters who cast them. Finally, they are decrypted and
tallied. Ballot mixing has to be performed verifiably. To that end, the polling
station computes a zero–knowledge proof to demonstrate that the cleartexts of
the received ballots are equal to the cleartexts of the mixed ballots. Such proofs
are usually hard to generate and verify in terms of computational effort. Their
conceptual complexity is also very high so that it is very difficult for observers
to get convinced about the security they enforce.
In blind signature-based voting schemes [10,17], a participant composes her
vote, encrypts it and then authenticates herself to a trusted authority (the
authentication server) who manages the electoral roll. That trusted authority
checks whether this is the first time the participant is authenticated. In that
case, the authentication server blindly signs [4] the participant’s ballot. Next,
the participant transmits her blindly signed ballot to the polling station through
an anonymous channel. The voting platform will only accept ballots that have
been signed by the authentication server. Once the voting period is concluded,
votes are decrypted and tallied. The process needs a verifiable anonymous chan-
nel if universal verifiability is needed.
The homomorphic tallying paradigm, first proposed in [6], is constructed
over a homomorphic public key cryptosystem. In this paradigm [3,12,14,15,23],
participants cast their votes encrypted under the homomorphic cryptosystem.
After collecting all the ballots, the polling station aggregates them using the
homomorphic operation. As a result, a single ciphertext is generated. Its de-
cryption will provide the homomorphic addition/multiplication of the cleartext
votes. An appropriate coding of votes permits to obtain the global vote tally
from this message. In such a system, the participants are required to prove in
zero-knowledge that their ballots have been properly composed [8,11]. These
proofs can be verified as ballots are being received by the polling station. How-
ever, their complexity renders this paradigm to be only applicable to elections
in which choices can be coded in a very simple way.
Homomorphic cryptosystems can be additive or multiplicative. The problem
when operating with a multiplicative homomorphism is that cleartext multiplica-
tion easily overflows the cryptosystem cleartext range. To avoid that, proposals
like [19,20] aggregate the ballots in small groups so that cleartext overflowing is
avoided. After that, the resulting aggregated ciphertexts are mixed. Although
such hybrid systems are more efficient that mix-type schemes, they are not as
fast as classic homomorphic tallying schemes.
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Helios 2.0 is a remote voting system that belongs to the homomorphic tallying
paradigm. The original Helios 1.0 was presented in [1] and has been successfully
used for small elections [2]. Our proposal is an improvement to Helios 2.0. It
enhances that system by allowing a better perception of blank ballots, especially
in elections in which voters can vote for more than one candidate. In addition,
the use of elliptic curve cryptography provides a better performance.
Motivation and Contribution
Although elliptic curve cryptography provides very fast encryption and decryp-
tion methods, it is rarely used within the homomorphic tallying remote voting
paradigm due to the elevated computational cost of the process required to
obtain the election result from the cleartext of the aggregated ciphertext. Fur-
thermore, there exist some zero- knowledge proofs that do not work with elliptic
curves while others just do not provide the security of their multiplicative group
version. Although the proposal in [3] is completely functional and meets all the
security requirements listed before, the proof and the verification of ballots as
well as its homomorphic decoding step have an elevated computational cost. In
this paper we exploit the additive homomorphic property of the Elliptic Curve
ElGamal cryptosystem to create an efficient remote voting protocol suitable for
real elections. The proposal allows to aggregate all the ballots into a single ci-
phertext, so a mixing step is not needed.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 recalls some theoretical aspects
of elliptic curve cryptography, focusing on the Elliptic Curve ElGamal cryptosys-
tem. Our proposal is described in Section 3. The security of the presented system
is discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 is devoted to provide some details
about the performance together with some concluding remarks.
2 Elliptic Curves
An elliptic curve E over a prime finite field Fp is an algebraic curve given by the
reduced Weierstraß equation [22],
E : y2 = x3 + ax + b,
with nonzero discriminant 4a3 + 27b2 6= 0. We denote by E(Fp) the set of points
(x, y) ∈ Fp×Fp that satisfy the curve equation, along with the point at infinity
O. An addition operation can be defined over E(Fp) using the chord-tangent
method. This operation endows the set E(Fp) with an abelian group structure
in which O is the identity element. Considering this group law, the Elliptic Curve
Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) consists in, given two points P and Q,
find an integer d that satisfies Q = dP . This is a computationally hard problem
when the cardinality of E(Fp) has a large prime factor.
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2.1 Elliptic Curve ElGamal Cryptosystem
In this paper, we use an analogue of the ElGamal cryptosystem [9] using elliptic
curves, the Elliptic Curve ElGamal (EC-ElGamal). For simplicity, only elliptic
curves defined over a prime order finite field are considered.
Setup and Key Creation. The setup of the cryptosystem requires choosing a
prime p, which defines a finite field Fp, and two parameters a and b defining an
elliptic curve E over Fp. We also need an order m point P ∈ E(Fp), such that
m is a large prime of the same size as p.
A private key is created by taking a random integer d ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}. The
corresponding public key is Q = dP .
Encryption and Decryption. A point V ∈ E(Fp) is encrypted under public
key Q as follows:
EncQ(V ) = C = (A,B) = (rP, V + rQ),
where r is a random integer in {1, . . . ,m− 1}.
A ciphertext C = (A,B) can be decrypted when the private key d is known.
The cleartext V is recovered by computing:
Decd(C) = V = B − dA.
A ciphertext C = (A,B) can be verifiably decrypted by publishing its clear-
text V and proving in zero-knowledge that logP Q = logA(B − V ) by means of
Chaum-Pedersen’s proof [5]. However, there is an alternative way to reveal the
cleartext of C. This can be done if the random value r generated for encryption
is known. First, we have to check whether rP equals A and next compute:
Revr(C) = V = B − rQ.
Homomorphic Property. The EC-ElGamal cryptosystem has a homomorphic
property with respect to the point addition operation. Two ciphertexts C1 =
(A1, B1) and C2 = (A2, B2), encrypting V1 and V2, can be aggregated as
C3 = C1 + C2 = (A1 + A2, B1 + B2) = ((r1 + r2)P, (V1 + V2) + (r1 + r2)Q).
The decryption of C3 provides V3 = V1 + V2 as a result.
3 E-voting Scheme
In this section, we present a remote voting system implemented using the EC-
ElGamal cryptosystem. Our proposal can be extended to accommodate multi-
candidate elections, as shown in Section 3.4.
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3.1 Participating Parties
We assume there exists a publicly readable Bulletin Board (BB) on which only
some specific authorities can write. Our protocol involves the following parties:
Registrar : it publishes the electoral roll on the BB.
Key Storage Trusted Party (KSTP): it generates and stores the election pri-
vate key and publishes the election public key on the BB. It will perform a
verifiable decryption when required. It may be a distributed entity.
Voters: eligible voters are those appearing in the electoral roll.
Polling Station (PS): it collects the ballots and, after verifying their correct
composition and checking the people casting them are listed in the electoral
roll, publishes them on the BB so that anyone can check their validity.
The BB is publicly accessible for reading, but only the Registrar, the KSTP
and the PS can write on it.
3.2 Voting System
The forthcoming system description assumes a single-choice election (see Sec-
tion 3.4 for multi-candidate elections). The system description is divided into
three phases: setup, vote casting and tallying. Each stage starts when the previ-
ous one ends.
Setup Phase. Let n be the amount of eligible voters in the electoral roll. First
of all, the Registrar publishes the electoral roll and the list of candidates L =
{L1, L2, . . . , Lk} on the BB. The electoral roll consists of a list of all the eligible
voters {v1, v2, . . . , vn} and their public keys pk1, pk2, . . . , pkn, which could be
certified by some certificate authority.
Next, the KSTP chooses a suitable elliptic curve and chooses a secret key d.
Next, it publishes an order m point P ∈ E(Fp) together with the election public
key Q = dP on the BB.
Reliability on the KSTP can be increased by distributing it into a set of
entities {KSTP1, . . . ,KSTPt}. Thus, each KSTPi generates its own private key
di and publishes Qi = diP . Then, the election public key is Q =
∑
iQi. A
message encrypted under Q can only be decrypted if all the entities composing
the KSTP do collaborate.
Finally, the PS publishes a point V of the same curve. It also precomputes
and stores the points V, 2V, . . . , bn/2cV . Each point iV is stored together with
the corresponding integer i in a hash table T .
Vote Casting Phase. A voter vi creates her ballot for a candidate Lj by
generating a ciphertext array (Ci,1, . . . , Ci,k, Ci,k+1) in which the cleartext of Ci,j
is 2V while the remaining ciphertexts are an encryption of V . Ciphertext Ci,k+1
would accommodate and eventual blank vote. Assuming the chosen candidate
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was Lk, vi would randomly select ri,1, . . . , ri,k, ri,k+1 ∈R {1, . . . ,m − 1} and
would generate:
Ci,j = (ri,jP, V + ri,jQ), for j 6= k,
Ci,k = (ri,kP, 2V + ri,kQ).
Next, vi signs her ballot and creates a zero-knowledge proof proving a proper
composition of it. This is done by means of the procedure described in Sec-
tion 3.3. Finally, she sends (Ci,1, Ci,2, . . . , Ci,k, Ci,k+1), her signature and the
zero-knowledge proof to the PS.
When the PS receives a ballot, it, firstly, verifies the signature using the
voter’s public key, available on the BB. Then, it checks that the voter has not
voted before and that no other ciphertext with the same ciphertexts has been
cast before by some other voter. Finally, it verifies the zero-knowledge proof. If
all the verifications are satisfied, it publishes the ballot, its zero-knowledge proof
and its signature on the BB. Otherwise, the ballot is discarded.
Vote Tallying Phase. When the vote casting phase has ended, the PS aggre-
gates the received ballots into a ciphertext array (T1, . . . , Tk, Tk+1) by comput-
ing,
Tj =
z∑
i=1
Ci,j =
(
z∑
i=1
Ai,j ,
z∑
i=1
Bi,j
)
, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1},
where z is the amount of voters that have cast a vote. Then, the PS asks the
KSTP to perform a verifiable decryption of each ciphertext Tj , obtaining
Decd(Tj) =
z∑
i=1
yi,jV, yi,j ∈ {1, 2}.
The value
∑z
i=1 yi,j ranges between z and 2z. Therefore, the PS computes
Decd(Tj) − zV = xjV and searches for xjV in the precomputed table T . If
candidate Lj has received more than bn/2c votes, then xjV will not be found in
the table. In that case, the PS computes x′jV = xjV − bn/2cV and checks x′jV
against T again. Thus, the number of votes for candidate Lj is xj = x′j + bn/2c.
This operation generates the amount of votes for candidate Lj , i.e. xj , as a
result.
3.3 Zero-Knowledge Proof of Correct Ballot Composition
During the vote casting phase, the voter must provide a zero-knowledge proof
proving her ballot has been properly composed. To that end, we have adapted a
non-interactive proof presented in [8], to operate with EC-ElGamal ciphertexts.
This proof proves in zero-knowledge that a given ciphertext is an encryption
of a point in a set {V1, V2, . . . , V`}. In our system, we prove that each component
of a ballot is an encryption of V or 2V . Moreover, by making use of the reveal
operation, presented in Section 2.1, we guarantee that a voter cannot vote for
more candidates than she is allowed. This is done by revealing the cleartext of
the ciphetext obtained from the aggregation of all the ballot components.
Elliptic Curve Array Ballots for Homomorphic Tallying Elections 7
Prover. The prover (voter vi) has to prove in zero-knowledge that each cipher-
text Ci,j = (Ai,j , Bi,j) in vector (Ci,1, . . . , Ci,k, Ci,k+1) is an encryption of either
V or 2V . Thus, for each j, if Ci,j is an encryption of V , the prover randomly
generates the values w′′j , u
′′
j , sj ∈R {1, . . . ,m− 1} and computes
A′j = sjP , B
′
j = sjQ,
A′′j = w
′′
j P + u
′′
jAi,j , B
′′
j = w
′′
jQ + u
′′
j (Bi,j − 2V ).
He also computes
challj = H(A′j , A′′j , B′j , B′′j ) (mod m),
u′j = challj − u′′j (mod m),
w′j = sj − u′jri,j (mod m),
where H is a cryptographic hash function like SHA-256 [7]. Recall that ri,j is
the random integer taken to generate Ci,j . On the other hand, if Ci,j is an
encryption of 2V , the prover will generate A′′j , B
′′
j as A
′
j , B
′
j and vice versa,
taking into account that the computation of B′j will involve V instead of 2V .
The generation of u′j and w
′
j will also be swapped with the generation of u
′′
j and
w′′j , respectively.
After that, the prover computes ri =
∑k+1
j=1 ri,j (mod m) and sends
A′j , A
′′
j , B
′
j , B
′′
j , u
′
j , u
′′
j , w
′
j , w
′′
j
for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k + 1, together with ri to the verifier.
Verifier. For each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k + 1, the verifier checks that
A′j = w
′
jP + u
′
jAi,j ,
A′′j = w
′′
j P + u
′′
jAi,j ,
B′j = w
′
jQ + u
′
j(Bi,j − V ),
B′′j = w
′′
jQ + u
′′
j (Bi,j − 2V ),
u′j + u
′′
j = H(A′j , A′′j , B′j , B′′j ).
(1)
Then, in order to prove the voter has voted for only one candidate, the verifier
aggregates Ci =
∑k+1
j=1 Ci,j and uses ri to reveal Ci = (Ai, Bi). Then it checks
that,
Revri(Ci) = Bi − riQ = (k + 2)V .
All these verifications ensure that vi has voted for just one candidate.
3.4 Multi-candidate Elections
Some elections allow voters to vote for more than one candidate or to choose up
to a number of candidates. Our scheme can accommodate this kind of elections
by slightly changing the ballot composition and the proof of correct composition.
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Setup Phase. The system is configured and the information is published as
described in Section 3.2. Moreover, the PS also publishes max and min, the
maximum and minimum amount of candidates to be voted in each ballot.
Vote Casting Phase. A voter vi generates a ballot in which f ciphertexts,
0 < min 6 f 6 max < k, are an encryption of 2V (the chosen candidates),
while the k− f remaining ones are an encryption of V (non-chosen candidates).
A blank vote is always permitted regardless of the value of min. Assuming that
the chosen candidates are indexed between k− f and k (with the blank subvote
at position k + 1), vi generates:
Ci,j = (ri,jP, V + ri,jQ) for j /∈ {k − f, . . . , k},
Ci,l = (ri,lP, 2V + ri,lQ) for k − f < l 6 k,
Ci,k+1 = (ri,k+1P, ri,k+1Q) and
Ci,aux = (rauxP, (max− f)V + rauxQ).
If the voter vi wants to cast a blank ballot, she will need to generate k ciphertexts
encrypting V , Ci,k+1 encrypting maxV , and Ci,aux encrypting O:
Ci,j = (ri,jP, V + ri,jQ) for 1 6 j 6 k,
Ci,k+1 = (ri,k+1P,maxV + ri,k+1Q) and
Ci,aux = (rauxP, rauxQ).
After that, the ballot is signed by vi.
When computing the proof of correct ballot composition, vi now generates a
proof that the cleartext of ballot Ci,k+1 is either O or maxV . Moreover, the
ciphertext Ci,aux is proven to encrypt a point in the set {O, V, . . . , (max −
min)V } [8]. Finally, she sends the values,
(Ci,1, . . . , Ci,k+1), Ci,aux,
their signature and the proofs to the PS. The PS will proceed as in a one-
candidate election, but the verification of the proof has to take into account
that the aggregated components ciphertext is computed as, Ci = (Ai, Bi) =∑k+1
j=1 Ci,j + Ci,aux so that,
Revri(Ci) = Bi − riQ = (k + max)V ,
with ri =
∑k+1
j=1 ri,j+ri,aux (mod m). The new ranges of Bi,k+1 and Bi,aux have
to be also taken into account. Notice that when min = max there is no need to
generate Ci,aux, since it will always correspond to an encryption of O.
Tallying Phase. Although in a multi-candidate election more than one candi-
date may receive more than bn/2c votes, the tallying phase remains the same
except for the blank votes. When the PS computes Tk+1 =
∑z
i=1 Ci,k+1, it will
obtain xk+1V = (max + 1)
−1Decd(Tk+1). Thus, it will search for xk+1V in
the table T . Notice that the values Ci,aux do not need to be aggregated nor
decrypted.
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4 Security
In this section, we prove that the presented e-voting system fulfills the secu-
rity requirements enumerated in Section 1. Our proofs assume a one-candidate
election. Their extension to multi-candidate elections is straightforward.
Authenticity. Only people in the electoral roll are able to cast a ballot since
each ballot is digitally signed by the participant casting it. The electoral roll,
which includes the public key of each voter, and the received ballots are publicly
available on the BB. Thus, any one can check ballot signatures.
Unicity. Our system has to ensure that each voter has not voted more than
once. As we have pointed out above, each ballot comes signed, so that two ballots
cast by the same voter are easily linked through the public key that permits to
verify their signature. The system must also ensure that the content of a ballot
represents a vote for just one candidate. This is proven by the following two
lemmata.
Lemma 1. Assuming H a secure cryptographic hash function, there is no ci-
phertext Ci,j able to pass the zero-knowledge proof unless it is an encryption of
either V or 2V .
Proof. Let us assume Ci,j = (Ai,j , Bi,j) = (ri,jP,X + ri,jQ) with X /∈ {V, 2V }.
According to the verifications that will be performed by the verifier (Eq. 1) the
attacker has to generate four points A′j , A
′′
j , B
′
j , B
′′
j and four integers u
′
j , u
′′
j , w
′
j , w
′′
j
satisfying
A′j = w
′
jP + u
′
jAi,j , B
′
j = w
′
jQ + u
′
j(Bi,j − V ),
A′′j = w
′′
j P + u
′′
jAi,j , B
′′
j = w
′′
jQ + u
′′
j (Bi,j − 2V ).
One possibility is to generate first u′j , u
′′
j , w
′
j , w
′′
j at random and compute A
′
j , A
′′
j ,
B′j , B
′′
j according to the previous formulas. In that case, the verifier performs an
additional checking requiring that H(A′j , A′′j , B′j , B′′j ) outputs exactly u′j + u′′j ,
which is unlikely because H is a secure hash function, so it is preimage resistant.
Another possibility is to generate w′j , u
′
j , sj , s
′
j ∈R {1, . . . ,m− 1} at random
and compute
A′j = w
′
jP + u
′
jAi,j , B
′
j = w
′
jQ + u
′
j(Bi,j − V ),
A′′j = sjP , B
′′
j = s
′
jQ.
Next, compute challj = H(A′j , A′′j , B′j , B′′j ) (mod m) and u′′j = challj − u′j
(mod m), and find a value w′′j such that:
A′′j = w
′′
j P + u
′′
jAi,j , B
′′
j = w
′′
jQ + u
′′
j (Bi,j − 2V ).
Let X = 2V + tQ. From the equality involving A′′k we get
w′′j = sj − u′′j ri,k (mod m).
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By substituting w′′k in the equality involving B
′′
k we get
s′j = sj + u
′′
j t.
If sj = s
′
j , the previous equality is satisfied if t = 0, in which case, Ci,j would be
an encryption of 2V or u′′j = 0 in which case, the output of H(A′j , A′′j , B′j , B′′j )
should be exactly u′j which is very unlikely. If sj 6= s′j , then it is required that
u′′j = (s
′
j−sj)t−1 (mod m) in which case, the output ofH(A′j , A′′j , B′j , B′′j ) should
be exactly (s′j − sj)t−1 + u′j which is very unlikely.
First generating w′′j , u
′′
j , sj , s
′
j ∈R {1, . . . ,m− 1} and next computing
A′j = sjP , B
′
j = s
′
jQ,
A′′j = w
′′
j P + u
′′
jAi,j , B
′′
j = w
′′
jQ + u
′′
j (Bi,j − 2V ),
leads to an equivalent situation. Hence, the claim follows.
Lemma 2. Assuming Lemma 1 is true, a voter can only vote for one candidate.
Proof. From Lemma 1, each Ci,j is an encryption of either V or 2V . Hence,
Ci =
∑k
j=1 Ci,j is an encryption of a point in the set {kV, (k + 1)V, . . . , 2kV }.
Revealing Ci outputs (k + 1)V if, and only if, all the ciphertexts Ci,j encrypts
V except one of them, whose plaintext is 2V .
Both lemmata remain true when changing the points V and 2V for any other
point pair. Furthermore, they are both true if the amount of possible points
increases.
Privacy. This property requires that the candidate chosen by each voter must
remain secret. In our system the vote is encrypted under the EC-ElGamal cryp-
tosystem, which is assumed to be a semantically secure cipher. Therefore, no
information can be obtained from an encrypted ballot. Assuming the KSTP
only deciphers the aggregated ballot, an attacker could only obtain information
from the proof of correct ballot composition. That proof, given in Section 3.3,
is composed of two parts. The first one proves that the cleartext in each of the
ciphertexts Ci,j is either V or 2V . The second one is a proof to validate that
just one candidate is voted in the ballot.
First, we will prove that the proof corresponding to the first part is zero-
knowledge. This is formalized by showing that there exists a simulator that can
produce a transcript that looks like a proper interaction in its interactive version.
That transcript is easy to generate if the challenge was known in advance.
Lemma 3. The proof correct ballot composition is zero-knowledge.
Proof. Given a value chall′j a simulator can generate a proof for any ciphertext
Ci,j = (Ai,j , Bi,j) by generating u
′
j , w
′
j , w
′′
j ∈R {1, . . . ,m − 1} at random and
next computing u′′j = chall
′
j − u′j . After that, it is easy to generate the points:
A′j = w
′
jP + u
′
jAi,j , B
′
j = w
′
jQ + u
′
j(Bi,j − V ),
A′′j = w
′′
j P + u
′′
jAi,j , B
′′
j = w
′′
jQ + u
′′
j (Bi,j − 2V ).
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These values would satisfy the conditions given in Eq. 1, regardless of the clear-
text of Ci,j . Hence, the claim follows.
In the second part of the proof, the prover reveals an integer ri, computed
as ri =
∑k+1
j=1 ri,j (mod m). The value ri reveals information about some ri,l if,
and only if, all the other values ri,j with j 6= l are known. Hence, no information
about any ri,l is leaked and no ciphertext Ci,l can be revealed.
Fairness. Assuming the KSTP behaves correctly, our system provides fairness
because no vote is decrypted until the vote casting phase has ended.
Verifiability. Our proposal offers universal verifiability because any entity can
check that all the ballots are cast by people who appear in the electoral roll by
verifying its digital signature. Additionally, the proof of correct vote composition
can also be verified by any entity who can also aggregate the received ballots
by itself and check that the PS performed this operation properly. Finally, the
aggregated ciphertexts are decrypted verifiably by the KSTP.
Coercion-Resistance. Our proposal is compatible with several coercion-resis-
tance solutions which are able to send a fake vote without the coercer noticing
it. Solutions like [13] can be adapted and included in our protocol.
5 Performance Analysis and Conclusion
Remote voting systems should provide both security and efficiency at the same
time. The cost of some parts of the system are more critical than the cost of
others. For example, in our proposal, during the vote casting phase, the voters are
required to prove in zero-knowledge a proper composition of their ballots. These
proofs are validated by the PS. It is desirable that the generation and verification
of these proofs are as fast as possible but, since the vote casting phase usually
takes a long time, and the proofs can be validated while the ballots are being
received, these validations are not a problem as long as the PS can handle them.
In contrast, the best efficiency is required for the tallying phase. This is
because a long tallying phase would cause a delay in the publication of the
election result.
In our performance analysis, we have first compared the encryption and de-
cryption costs of ElGamal and EC-ElGamal cryptosystems. Table 1 shows the
results for different security levels. It can be seen that EC-ElGamal is more
efficient than ElGamal. The difference in cost between the two cryptosystems
increases with the security level. From the obtained results, we can state that
by using EC-ElGamal we can achieve a 50% efficiency gain, at least.
Next, we have compared the current proposal with an implementation of a
similar remote voting scheme presented in [3]. The system in [3], which will be
called redundant scheme from now on, is also implemented over elliptic curves.
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Table 1. Comparison between encryption and decryption times (ms) of ElGamal and
EC-ElGamal.
Bits
ElGamal EC-ElGamal
Encryption Decryption Encryption Decryption
1024 — 160 1.589 0.879 0.897 0.484
2048 — 224 11.822 6.201 1.311 0.662
3072 — 256 61.294 32.533 1.650 0.843
It includes a redundancy system in order to decrease the time required for ob-
taining the election result from the aggregated ciphertext. In the simulation of
that scheme, we have used homomorphic packages of 500, 1000 and 100000 ag-
gregated ballots, depending on the number of voters (5000, 10000 and 1000000,
respectively). Our current proposal is able to homomorphically aggregate all the
ballots into a single ciphertext with just a slight increase in the preprocessing
time. Hence, the presented simulations create packages with 5000, 10000 and
1000000 aggregated ballots.
Although the redundant scheme is more efficient at ballot creation, Table 2
shows it is twice as fast as the current one, in most phases it requires more
time than the new proposal. In the redundant scheme, a ballot is composed of
2·dk/4e ciphertexts while the current proposal contains k, being k the number of
candidates. However, this fact is not enough to consider the redundant scheme
is better. Table 2 shows that the zero-knowledge proof validation is twice slower
in the redundant scheme than in the current proposal. Proof generation requires
the computation of 47·dk/4e+18 ' 12·k multiplications in the redundant scheme
while the current proposal only needs 6 · k. On the other hand, the verification
requires 56 · dk/4e+ 20 ' 14 · k multiplications in the redundant scheme, while
the current scheme only needs 8 · k. The time required for ballot validation is
more critical. This is because each voter has to create just one ballot while the
PS has to validate all of them.
Table 2. Time (ms) spent to compose and prove a ballot (voter) and verify it (PS).
k
Current scheme Redundant scheme
Compose Prove Verify Compose Prove Verify
4 3.428 10.572 14.481 1.710 29.911 33.099
16 13.668 42.385 56.630 6.789 95.844 106.350
64 54.582 169.357 224.867 26.967 359.720 400.342
Finally, we have also compared the time required for decryption and tally.
Table 3 shows the current proposal is faster in both cases. In the new proposal,
decryption only requires the computation of k multiplications. In contrast, in
the redundant scheme, it involves zt dk/4e multiplications, where z is the number
of ballots and t is the capacity of the homomorphic packages (500, 1000 and
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100000, as mentioned above). On the other hand, obtaining the result from
the aggregated cleartext, in the new method, involves a point multiplication, a
point subtraction and a query to the hash table T . In contrast, the redundant
scheme involves n subtractions and (n + 1) hash queries (see [3] for a detailed
description).
Table 3. Time (ms) spent to decrypt and tally the aggregated ballots.
k Voters
Current scheme Redundant scheme
Decryption Tally Decryption Tally
4
5000
1.760
0.273
8.649
60.494
10000 0.273 120.721
1000000 0.424 12 084.549
16
5000
6.856
1.079
34.602
60.139
10000 1.092 124.119
1000000 1.610 12 218.945
64
5000
27.434
4.273
137.509
61.470
10000 4.260 121.982
1000000 6.284 12 245.186
As a conclusion, we state that the remote voting protocol presented in this
paper is efficient and, therefore, suitable for its use in real remote voting pro-
cesses. All the simulations have been implemented in C++, using the Crypto++
library and have been run on a PC with an Intel Core i5 650 3.2GHz CPU and
4GB of RAM, running a Debian 7.8 Wheezy OS. Additionally, the times shown
in Tables 2 and 3 have been obtained using 160 bit elliptic curves.
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